intrODUCtiOn
The article by Fisher (2007 Fisher ( -2008 clearly is by far the best attempt yet to measure physician productivity. Unfortunately, his estimates are sensitive to the numerous assumptions he necessarily had to make because of inadequacies in the data. In this comment we examine several of those assumptions in order to form a judgment about the overall amount of uncertainty surrounding his estimates.
assUmptiOn 1
Fisher has two sources of physician income, but neither covers the entire period nor splits physician income into a labor component and a return-on-equity (ROE) in the physician's practice. From his sources he constructs a single measure of annual income over the 1982-2004 period. His principal source is the gross receipts data from the National Income and Prod uct Accounts (NIPA). The NIPA figure
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includes not only data on gross receipts in physicians offices, but also receipts of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) centers. The inclusion of ASCs and HMOs would not distort Fisher's results with respect to physician offices if physician offices were a constant share for all his calculations over the period, but we know that is not the case since ASCs have grown. Because they are still a rather small share of total receipts (most likely under 5 percent), however, the error from this assumption is probably modest.
From the NIPA figure on gross receipts Fisher deducts estimated amounts for other inputs, including wages of non-physi cian employees, certain intermediate in puts, business taxes, and depreciation. Not all intermediate inputs, however, are in cluded in the NIPA figures on intermedi ate inputs, so the residual from this cal culation includes both physician income and some remaining intermediate inputs.
To remove the remaining intermediate inputs from the residual NIPA values, Fisher uses a second source of physician income, three surveys carried out in 1995 , 1999 , and 2003 (Tu and Ginsburg, 2006 There are at least two potential problems with this procedure in addition to the issue of the inclusion of the ASC and HMO data in the NIPA values. First, the BEA input/output data include dentists as well as physicians. If dentists' share of income and intermediate inputs relative to gross revenues differs from physicians', the 1987 and 1992 values are not comparable to the values from the Ginsburg surveys since the Ginsburg values pertain solely to physicians. Second, the interpolations and extrapolations pose a potential source of error, especially since the Ginsburg data are from a sample of physicians and thus will contain some measurement error which will enter both measured endpoints. Because these endpoints are used to compute the trend over a relatively short period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , the measurement error could be material. Overall, how much these factors affect the estimates is unclear.
The resulting income values also con tain a potential ROE, which Fisher wishes to net out to obtain a pure measure of labor compensation. He does so by us ing net profit rates for incorporated phy sicians (from Statistics of Income), and imputing that rate to all other types of physicians, thus making the assumption that profit rates are similar across all types of physicians.
Fisher runs some sensitivity tests by obtaining data from the BEA on the proportion of ambulatory health services that are intermediate inputs and from the U.S. Census Bureau on the same pro portion for physician offices. These additional data are reproduced in Table 1 
assUmptiOn 2
To obtain an estimate of changes in real output, Fisher must deflate expenditures on physician services by a price index. To do so he uses the Producer Price Index (PPI) for 1998 and later, but he must use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) before 1997. (He uses a BEA transition value for 1997.) Although the PPI is based on transaction prices, the CPI is based on list prices, so Fisher needs an estimate of transaction prices in the pre-1997 period. Thus, the uncertainty about income is compounded by uncertainty about the magnitude of physician discounts or allowances in the pre-1997 period. years (because the Medicare-only data, which are available annually, seem to follow a quadratic form). To fit the quadratic for all payers, Fisher has three unknowns, namely the three coefficients of a quadra tic, but only two data points (1975 and 1996) . To identify the equation he therefore imposes the first derivative of the quadratic from the change in the Medicare-only allowance from 1975 to 1976. His logic is presumably that both Medicare and private discounts (allowances) were small in both 1975 and 1976 and hence the Medicare change in those 2 years equaled the change in private allowances. He then applies the predicted values of the allowance rate to the CPI to get an estimated index of transaction prices.
There are three strong and ultimately untestable assumptions in this method that:
• Medicare plus private discounts fol lowed a quadratic form over the 1975 1996 period.
• The first derivative of the quadratic can be imposed from the 1975-1976 change.
• The Medicare discounts and private discounts were essentially equal in the mid-1970s. There are some data bearing on the second assumption. Any independent measurement error in levels will be compounded in measures of change, and any measurement error in the 1975 to 1976 change will affect all of Fisher's calculated values. Table 2 shows the year-to-year changes in the Medicare allowance rate for the years [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . Clearly the amount of annual change is a noisy variable, with the largest single change being the one that Fisher used.
In addition to this method of computing a price index, Fisher calculates an alter native price index based on the ratio of Medicare physician rates to the commer cial rates of two national insurers. These data, collected for the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), cover the periods from 1989-1996 and 1999 2004. To extrapolate them backward from 1989 and to impute values for 1997 and 1998, Fisher observes that there is a near perfect correlation between these data and CMS data on the proportion of physician revenue from private sources. He uses this relationship to impute values for the years that are missing from the MedPAC data. Table 3 compares the values Fisher uses based on the Medicare allowances with those calculated from the MedPAC data. Over the 1985-1997 period Fisher's series is going up annually 1 percentage point faster than the series from the MedPAC data (3.3 versus 2.3 percent). Moreover, there are some substantial differences in certain years. Because the multifactor productivity (MFP) measure is a trailing 10-year average, extreme values in any one year can make a non-trivial difference to the 10-year average as they enter or exit the moving average. Despite these potential problems, we find the congru ence between the 7 data points from 1989 to 1996 in which Fisher's "backcasted" PPI overlaps with the MedPAC data comforting (R 2 = 0.87). We only wish the overlap period were longer.
Before leaving this point, we agree with Fisher that the PPI should be used for 1998 and later, but in appraising the con fidence one should have in the resulting MFP values, it would be helpful to know how often the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis tics is actually able to obtain transaction prices. In 1997 less than one-half the in tended number of practices were included in the sample (Berndt et al., 2000) , although the situation may have improved since that time.
assUmptiOn 3
The physician services billed under the Medicare fee schedule include those in both inpatient and outpatient settings. No data source estimates the capital applied in the inpatient setting, so Fisher can hard ly be faulted for omitting it. Nonetheless, some of the observed change in physician productivity is likely attributable to changes in capital inputs in that setting. Given the volume of physician services carried out in the hospital, including in the out patient department, this omission could be material.
Omitting hospital capital has one further implication. To the degree the site of care has shifted from the hospital to the office or the ASC, measured productivity is biased down, because the share of un measured inputs is falling. Shifting the site of care among the outpatient department, inpatient care, and the ASC also is a problem to the degree intermediate input and labor mixes differ among these sites, since Fisher's data on those inputs are from all those sites combined.
assUmptiOn 4
To estimate the labor input, Fisher must estimate changes in physician hours. To do so he uses Current Population Survey data on office-based physicians, but hospital-based physicians are not in cluded. According to American Medical Association data, office-based physicians are about 75 percent of all patient care physicians. Thus, Fisher does not count some attending physicians in teaching hospitals who bill Medicare. 2 More importantly, his calculations do not include residents who do not bill, but who augment productivity of the senior physicians who do bill Medicare. This is a problem to the degree that the share of hospital-based physician hours is changing or the share of resident hours is changing. During the period in question legislated limits on resident hours were enacted, so it is plausible that the share of resident hours fell. This would have caused measured physician productivity to fall.
assUmptiOn 5
The available data permit only a crude adjustment for changes in specialty mix, which matters to the degree the specialty mix changes and productivity is differen tial between specialties. Specialties with a higher proportion of new procedures may have greater true productivity change because of learning-by-doing, and in practice changes in the relative value units may not fully account for this change. Specialists may also be more productive in ways that are not measured for the same Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System code, such as more accurate diagnoses in the same length visit or fewer tests (or vice versa) to reach a diagnosis. This last point is related to the issue of whether the relative value unit defines a homogeneous product across specialties.
assUmptiOn 6
Fisher calculates the ROE from the return to incorporated physician offices,
